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Emotions encompass cognitive and behavioural responses to reward and pun-
ishment. Using contests as a case-study, we propose that short-term emotions
underpin animals’ assessments, decision-making and behaviour. Equating
contest assessments to emotional ‘appraisals’, we describe how contestants
appraise more than resource value and outcome probability. These appraisals
elicit the cognition, drive and neurophysiology that governs aggressive behav-
iour.We discuss how recent contest outcomes induce long-termmoods, which
impact subsequent contest behaviour. Finally, we distinguish between integral
(objectively relevant) and incidental (objectively irrelevant) emotions and
moods (affective states). Unlike existing ecological models, our approach
predicts that incidental events influence contest dynamics, and that contests
become incidental influences themselves, potentially causing maladaptive
decision-making. As affective states cross contexts, a more holistic ethology
(incorporating emotions and moods) would illuminate animal cognition
and behaviour.1. Introduction
Consider this: animal behaviour is underpinned by emotions and moods (‘affec-
tive states’; see [1–11]). We define emotions as short-term states elicited by stimuli
(or their predictors) that animals will work to acquire (rewards; e.g. prey) or avoid
(punishments; e.g. predators [5,12,13]). Moods are long-term states, which rep-
resent the cumulative average of emotions over time [14,15]. These functional
definitions apply to any organismwith a central nervous system [1]. Animal wel-
fare scientists, neuroscientists and psychopharmacologists now recognize that
affective states play a key role in decision-making [6,7]. However, behavioural
ecologists and fundamental ethologists have not yet embraced emotions and
moods [16].
Two main dimensions characterize affective states: valence and arousal
[6,17–19] (figure 1). Valence,which ranges frompositive to negative, encapsulates
the fitness benefits and costs associated with a stimulus, either anticipated or
actual [7]. Meanwhile, arousal (emotional intensity) indicates stimulus impor-
tance or urgency. High-arousal affective states divert attentional resources to
the stimulus [20] and predispose vigorous action [21]. As well as emotions and
moods, valence and arousal define sensations (e.g. pain) and interoception
(which internal stimuli elicit; e.g. hunger [10]). Burgdorf & Panksepp [22] hypo-
thesized that positive-valence, high-arousal states represent the activation of a
reward acquisition system, whereas negative-valence, high-arousal states rep-
resent the activation of a punishment avoidance system. By conceptualizing
affective states in terms of reward and punishment, this dimensional approach
captures their evolutionary function and avoids categorical labels that can lead













Figure 1. Valence and arousal define affective states (grey box), which
encompasses emotions and moods [6]. Moving from Q3–Q1 is increasingly





Anderson & Adolphs [1] identified two further charac-
teristics of affective states. As well as having valence and
arousal (scalability), emotions ‘generalize’: various stimuli and
situations can induce a particular affective state, and affective
states can be associated with various behavioural responses.
Affective states also ‘persist’ after stimulus removal. Thus,
emotions do not mediate fixed responses to specific stimuli,
because fixed responses neither generalize nor persist.
Examples of non-affective behaviours therefore include with-
drawal reflexes (which are genetically encoded from birth)
and sexual imprinting (which is learnt during development
andsubsequently invariant). Emotions, on theotherhand, facili-
tate flexible behaviour in complex, variable environments [23].
We propose that animal contests are an example of affective
behaviour. Contests are direct inter-individual interactions that
determine access to resources, such as food, mates or territory
(i.e. rewards [24]). Resource value (RV) is the fitness benefit of
the resource [25]. Contest costs include energy and time
expenditure, injury and even death (i.e. punishments [26]).
Greater potential benefits justify greater costs, so increasing
RV increases investment [27,28]. However, contest costs and
outcomes are not fixed. Resource-holding potential (RHP) is
the ability to win contests, comprising traits like size, skill
and weaponry [29–31]. Animals with a higher RHP are better
at winning, so they are more likely to gain resources. Contests
involve acquiring resources and avoiding punishments
(valence), vary in intensity and escalation (arousal), are elicited
by diverse stimuli and exhibited in various ways (generaliz-
ation), and continue after the inciting event (persistence).
These features imply an internal (i.e. affective) state mediating
the link between reward, punishment and contest behaviour.
Previous researchers have not comprehensively applied
affective state theory to animal contests. However, concep-
tualized as responses to rewards, punishments and their
predictors, emotions cover contest information-gathering,
decision-making and behaviour. This novel approach
extends and refines contest motivation models. For example,
Elwood & Arnott [32] explained contest dynamics in terms of
two dimensions: RV and costs. A contestant engages if RV
exceeds costs and withdraws if costs exceed RV. Whereas RV
usually remains stable, costs accumulate throughout the contest.
If costs increase enough to exceed RV, a contestant’s strategy
switches from engage to withdraw. This model approximatesthe valencedimension of affective states—RVrepresentingposi-
tive valence and costs representing negative valence—except
that valence is not specific to contests [6,7,14,15].
In this review, we use contests as a case study for apply-
ing emotion theory to behavioural ecology and fundamental
ethology. We argue that contestants evaluate contest benefits
and costs, and that these ‘appraisals’ elicit emotional episodes
encompassing contest decisions and behaviour. We describe
how the affective outcome of contests might produce experi-
ence effects: prior winners’ tendency to initiate and win (and
prior losers’ tendency to avoid and lose) subsequent contests.
Unlike traditional ecological models, our perspective predicts
that affective states previously induced in other behavioural
contexts will impact contest dynamics. These objectively irre-
levant influences could mediate contest decisions and cause
maladaptive behaviour.2. Structure of emotions
Emotions are elicited by appraisals: evaluations of stimuli, their
context and their personal significance [33]. Scherer [34] pro-
posed that humans sequentially appraise stimulus novelty,
intrinsic valence, congruence with personal goals, outcome
probability, discrepancy from expectations, situation controll-
ability, other individuals’ responsibility and whether potential
responses are socially acceptable. Appraisal outcomes deter-
mine and differentiate emotions [35], with continuously
updated re-appraisals regulating the response [36]. Othermam-
mals, birds and fish also appear to appraise stimuli [23].
In lambs (Ovis aries), for example, stimulus novelty, discrepancy
from expectations, controllability and social context impact
physiology and behaviour [37]. These inferred appraisals
elicit flexible emotional responses, which account for current
conditions and personal circumstances, as well as intrinsic
stimulus characteristics.
Emotions have multiple components that can be measured
empirically [10,38] (figure 2). These include changes in (i) cog-
nition (information-gathering and processing), (ii) drive
(manifested as the work animals will invest to access reward
or avoid punishment) and (iii) neurophysiology (central and
peripheral nervous system activity, and neuroendocrine
function). Such changes facilitate the performance of (iv) be-
haviour, producing an organism-level response to reward
and punishment [5,39,40]. Threatening stimuli, for instance,
impact (i) cognition (increasing attention to the threat),
(ii) drive (maximizing thework animals will invest in perform-
ing freeze, fight or flight responses) and (iii) neurophysiology
(activating both the sympathetic nervous system and hypo-
thalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis). These changes prepare the
individual for (iv) behaviour (avoiding, attacking or escaping
the threat).
Conscious feelings, another potential emotion component,
cannot be directly measured. Humans describe feelings
through language, which animals cannot do. As a result,
animal researchers usually study other emotion components
and remain agnostic about feelings [4,9,10]. Indeed, many
human psychologists recognize unconscious emotion, where
measurable components occur without corresponding feelings
[41]. For example, Winkielman et al. [42] showed people posi-
tive or negative facial expressions. The images appeared too
briefly for conscious awareness. When subsequently offered a

























Figure 2. An emotional episode (white box). Appraisals of stimuli, their con-
text and their personal significance elicit the emotion (grey box), whose
components include cognition, drive and neurophysiology. These components
govern the expression of behaviour. Conscious ‘feelings’ (not shown) are





more, drank more and paid more than subjects shown the
negative expression. Self-reported affective states did not
differ between treatments. In animals, the relationship between
feeling and non-feeling emotion components is an important
area for future research [43]. However, for present purposes,
we view emotions as functional states that may or may not
be accompanied by feelings.
Animal welfare scientists and psychopharmacologists
investigate affective states through both experiment and
observation. In emotion induction experiments, rewards
(e.g. enrichment [44]) induce positive emotions, and punish-
ments (e.g. social defeat [45]) induce negative emotions [13].
Pharmacological manipulations may also induce positive- and
negative-valence states [46]. Observationally, the measurable
components of an emotional episode can indicate valence [4].
This includes changes in (i) cognition (attention [47], judgement
[48,49] and memory biases [50]), (ii) drive (the work animals
will invest to access reward or avoid punishment [51,52]), (iii)
neurophysiology (brain and neuroendocrine circuits [5,8], and
peripheral nervous system activity [2]) and (iv) behaviour
(approach, exploration and play are often positively valenced,
whereas avoidance and hiding are often negatively valenced
[2]). A detailed discussion of empirical methods is beyond our
scope, but we direct readers to previous reviews on measuring
affective states in animals [2,4,6–8,10,11,47–49,51,52].3. Initiating, escalating and quitting contests
Contest theorists emphasize two key assessments: animals
assess RV (which determines fitness benefits and motivation)
and RHP (which predicts fitness costs and outcome likelihood
[25,29]). Contestants may assess only their own RHP (self-
assessment [53,54]) or compare their RHP to their opponent’s
(mutual assessment [26,28,55]). In a meta-analysis of 36
species’ assessment strategies, Pinto et al. [56] found that
self-assessment is more common than mutual assessment.Appraisal theoryarticulates and extends contest theory. The
former predicts broader evaluations of the resource, opponent
and context, all related back to the individual’s own goals.
Under Scherer’s [34] sequential theory, contestants would first
appraise novelty. Familiar resources are valued above novel
resources (e.g. residency effects [57,58]), while dominance hier-
archies reduce aggression towards familiar rivals [59]. Second,
contestants would appraise the resource’s intrinsic valence
(objective RV; e.g. the calories in food). Third, contestants
would appraise whether the resource contributes to their
goals (subjective RV; e.g. starving animals value food most
[60]). Fourth, contestants would appraise outcome probability
(which covers RHP assessments). Animals avoid or de-escalate
contests they will probably lose [29]. Fifth, contestants would
appraise discrepancy from expectations. Compared to uncondi-
tioned controls, animals trained that a stimulus signals reward
become more aggressive when the stimulus is unrewarded
[61–63]. Sixth, contestantswould appraise their response’s com-
patibility with social context. Observer presence can modify
animals’ behaviour (audience effects [64–66]) and watching
contests can modify the observers’ subsequent behaviour
(bystander effects [64,67]). During ongoing contests, animals
also reappraise assessments, adjusting their behaviour as infor-
mation and costs accumulate [31,55]. These appraisals have all
been empirically documented, but several are not incorporated
into current contest theory.
We further postulate that appraisals unify reward and pun-
ishment inputs into a decision-making common currency
[68,69]. This facilitates cross-context comparisons between
competing emotions, moods, sensations and interoception.
For instance, food-deprived goldfish (Carassius auratus)
endure more electric shocks to feed than well-fed goldfish
[60]. Following shocks, fewer hermit crabs (Pagurus bernhardus)
evacuate preferred Littorina shells than non-preferred Gibbula
shells [70]. We conceptualize valence as the common currency
in these reward/punishment trade-offs. Contestants likewise
weigh RV against potential contest costs and outcome likeli-
hood [32]. In self-assessment, contestants’ affective states
integrate RV and own RHP information. Animals persist
until they reach a negative-valence threshold: the maximum
cost they will pay for the resource. This threshold may be
energetic [71,72] or include injury costs as well [73]. In
mutual assessment, affective states integrate RV, own RHP
and opponent RHP information. Animals withdraw when
they establish that their opponent has a higher RHP [55], per-
haps when they tip below neutral valence. Both self- and
mutual assessment models require unidimensional (valence)
comparisons of fitness-relevant information.
Affective statesmay also determine an assessment strategy.
Researchers traditionally viewed assessment strategies as
fixed (e.g. [29,32,74]), but now recognize individual- and popu-
lation-level variation [75–77]. For example, green anoles (Anolis
carolinensis) [78], mangrove killifish (Kryptolebias marmoratus)
[79] and fiddler crabs (Uca mjoebergi) [80] use mutual assess-
ment when deciding whether to escalate a contest, and self-
assessment during the fight. Humans in positive affective
states rely on heuristics (i.e. rules of thumb) more than
humans in negative affective states [81]. When assessing the
strength of an argument, for instance, people experiencing
positive emotions use the author’s expertise, whereas people
in neutral states judge the content (i.e. deeper processing
[82,83]). In animal contests, positive valence may also promote











Figure 3. Cumulative emotional valence determines mood [11] (manifested
in aggression). Considering only integral (objectively contest-relevant) influ-
ences, white dots are wins and black dots are losses. Considering both
integral and incidental (objectively contest-irrelevant) influences, white




4self-assessment or rules of thumb (e.g. ‘resident wins’;
see [84]). Future research could manipulate affective states to
test this. We hypothesize that prior reward will lead to self-
assessment, whereas prior punishment will lead to mutual
assessment.
Having defined emotions as functional responses to reward
and punishment, we can say that contest assessments (i.e.
appraisals) elicit emotions. We propose that positive emotions
about potential contests indicate that fitness benefits outweigh
perceived costs, activating a reward acquisition system [6,7].
This system covers (i) cognition (information gathering
and decisions to enter and escalate contests), (ii) drive (work
invested to attack), (iii) neurophysiology (dopamine and
opioid activity) and (iv) behaviour (threat displays and aggres-
sion). By contrast, negative emotions indicate that perceived
contest costs outweigh fitness benefits, activating a punish-
ment avoidance system. This system covers (i) cognition
(information gathering and decisions to avoid and withdraw),
(ii) drive (work invested to escape), (iii) neurophysiology
(reduced serotonergic activity) and (iv) behaviour (submission
and retreat).
From a human perspective, linking positive valence and
aggressive behaviour may seem counterintuitive. Anger, for
instance, feels negative [85], but causes aggression [86,87].
However, this perspective is based on our conscious experience
of emotion (i.e. the feeling component). The non-feeling com-
ponents indicate that anger is a reward acquisition emotion
(i.e. positive valence), not a punishment avoidance emotion
(i.e. negative valence [88]). Anger drives approach towards
the inducing stimulus, whereas negative-valence emotions
drive withdrawal [88]. As a result, our functional definition of
emotion—which does not require conscious feeling—categor-
izes anger as positively valenced. Negative-valence emotions
can lead to aggressive behaviour, but only when withdrawal
is not an option (e.g. cornered animals lashing out). In the pre-
sent manuscript, we only consider positive-valence aggression,
where the aim is resource acquisition.
This review focuses on contest initiation, winning and
losing, but affective states might also govern behavioural
transitions within contests, such as levels of display or esca-
lated aggression (e.g. [78–80]). From an emotion standpoint,
the transitions at either end of contests are more empirically
tractable. Applying an emotional event pre-contest indicates
how emotions influence initiation, for example, whereas
applying an emotional event between contests indicates
how emotions disrupt experience effects. Tracking emotions
during contests is more challenging, as contests are ongoing
emotional events. To resolve this issue, we propose startling
contestants at set points during a contest [29,89]. Motivation
theorists interpret faster contest resumption (i.e. shorter star-
tle latencies) as stronger motivation to fight [33]. However,
affective state influences the startle reflex [47]. In humans
[90], rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) [91] and rats (Rattus
norvegicus) [90], negative-valence states increase startle dur-
ation and magnitude. Future researchers could use startle
duration to understand how valence relates to within-contest
behavioural transitions.
To summarize, emotion theory correctly predicts that con-
test assessments cover more than RV and RHP. Animals assess
the resource, opponent and context in relation to individual cir-
cumstances. We hope researchers investigate whether
additional human appraisals influence contest dynamics in
other species. For example, perhaps agency appraisals (whowas responsible? what did they intend?) influence contest
decision-making. Under our definition of emotion, these
appraisals elicit emotional responses that reflect personal-
circumstances and prevailing conditions. Conceptualizing
cognition, drive and neurophysiology as a unified affective
state underpinning behaviour explains existing results and
generates new hypotheses.4. Contest outcome and experience effects
Contest outcomes indicate how an individual’s RHP compares
with the population’s RHP [92,93]. Assuming self-assessment,
wins signal relatively high personal RHPand losses signal rela-
tively low personal RHP. Winners, therefore, initiate, escalate
and win more subsequent contests (winner effects), whereas
losers avoid and lose more subsequent contests (loser effects
[94–96]). We conceptualize contests as emotional events, so
winning induces positive-valence emotions that increase
aggressive behaviour and losing induces negative-valence
emotions that reduce aggressive behaviour (even if actual
RHPdoes not change). By reflecting cumulative emotional out-
comes, winner and loser effects represent long-term moods
(figure 3).
Both emotions and moods cause cognitive changes, such
as judgement and decision-making biases [97]. People in
positive affective states interpret ambiguous stimuli more
optimistically than people in negative affective states [81],
whereas pessimistic judgements characterize depression and
anxiety [81,98–100]. Animals also exhibit judgement biases.
Under ambiguity, mammals, birds, fish and insects in posi-
tive affective states have higher expectations of reward and
lower expectations of punishment than animals in negative
affective states [7,46,48,49,101]. Assuming reward and
punishment experience predicts likely outcomes in the pre-
sent, moods indicate whether ambiguous stimuli signal
positive or negative outcomes, leading to judgement biases
[14,49]. We therefore suggest that mood-induced judgement
bias underlies contest experience effects. Winners gain fit-
ness-enhancing resources, so winning is positively valenced.
Thus, previous winners should be relatively optimistic
about unknown rewards (RV) and outcome likelihood




5meanwhile, is negatively valenced, so losers should be more
pessimistic and less aggressive. Indeed, perceived RHP, rather
than actual RHP, influences winner and loser effects [94,95]
(cf. [102]).
Empirical evidence suggests that contests induce judge-
ment biases. Researchers have trained both dominant and
subordinate animals to associate one stimulus with a high-
value reward (leading to shorter response latencies) and
another stimulus with a low-value reward or no reward
(leading to longer response latencies). When subsequently
presented with untrained intermediate stimuli, dominant ani-
mals respond faster and more frequently than subordinates
(rats [103]; pigs, Sus scrofa [104]; tufted capuchins, Sapajus
apella [105]). We interpret the dominant animals’ higher
reward anticipation as optimism, which may reflect wins
inducing positive valence. In similar tasks, rats [45] and
Murray cod (Maccullochella peelii) [106] that repeatedly lose
contests exhibit lower reward anticipation towards ambigu-
ous stimuli, which we interpret as pessimism. Equivalent
opponent-directed behaviour—the reduced likelihood of
attacking an ambiguous rival—would constitute a loser
effect. As judgement biases influence responses to ambiguity
more than responses to predictable outcomes [7,49], we
hypothesize that judgement biases impact behaviour in con-
tests with unpredictable outcomes (where opponents have
similar RHP) more than contests with predictable outcomes
(where opponents’ RHP differs markedly).
Experience effects also suggest that contests can be intrinsi-
cally rewarding [107]. In addition to yielding external reward,
aggressive behaviour itself (and particularlywinning) seems to
induce positive affective states, which may inform future
decisions. For example, mice (Mus musculus) learn instrumen-
tal responses to access and attack submissive opponents [108].
Responses decline for non-submissive opponents, revealing
that outcome matters. Moreover, winning induces conditioned
place preference in mice [109], Syrian hamsters (Mesocricetus
auratus) [110] and green anoles [111]. From an affective state
perspective, positive emotions reward this conditioning. Affec-
tive reinforcement might also occur within a single contest. For
instance, accurate strikes [30] or appropriate assessments [112]
may be rewarding.
To recap, we suggest that moods, which reflect contest
outcome experience, mediate expectations about unknown
RV and future outcomes. Mood-induced judgement bias
and affective reinforcement may underpin these experience
effects. To investigate judgement bias, contest researchers
could measure optimism pre- and post-contest (see [48,49]).
We predict that wins induce optimism and losses induce
pessimism, with state optimism producing winner effects
and state pessimism producing loser effects. Exploring the
role of neurotransmitters linked to reward, such as opioids,
could reveal whether contests are intrinsically rewarding.5. Crossing behavioural contexts
So far, we have considered adaptive affective states. There are
clear fitness benefits to cumulative experience informing
reliable assessments, but existing optimality models already
predict these effects. How do emotions and moods advance
our understanding?
Integral affective states are objectively relevant to a cogni-
tive process. In humans, for example, sunshine (stimulus)induces positive valence (emotion) that causes a decision (cog-
nition) to go outside (behaviour). Incidental affective states, on
the other hand, influence objectively unrelated cognitive pro-
cesses [38,81,113–115]. For example, people rate their overall
life satisfaction higher on sunny days than rainy days [116].
Sunshine (stimulus) induces positive valence (emotion) that
causes an objectively unrelated assessment (cognition) to be
reported positively (behaviour). Incidental affective states,
thus, distinguish optimal and affective decision-making.
Optimality models only use integral information, whereas
affective states incorporate incidental influences as well.
Although understudied in behavioural ecology, incidental
affective states influence animal cognition and behaviour.
Starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) with enriched housing judge unre-
lated temporal stimuli more optimistically [44], while
honeybees (Apis mellifera) shaken aversively judge unrelated
olfactory stimuli more pessimistically [117]. Moreover, isolat-
ing rats improves recall of unrelated light and sound stimuli
[50]. It follows that incidental information may influence
contest behaviour, and that rewards and punishments in gen-
eral—not wins and losses specifically—induce ‘winner’ and
‘loser’ effects (figure 3). For instance, positive valence female
interactions increase aggressive behaviour in male speckled
wood butterflies (Pararge aegeria) [118] andwolf spiders (Veno-
nia coruscans) [119], whereas negative-valence predator
exposure decreases aggressive behaviour in daffodil cichlids
(Neolamprologus pulcher) [120]. However, a note of caution:
apparently incidental influences may be functionally integral.
The presence of a potential mate, for example, increases con-
test benefits, and predation risk increases contest costs [118–
120]. We must understand a species’s ecology to determine
whether cross-context variables are objectively relevant, and
hence whether they are integral or incidental. We welcome
new research to fill this knowledge gap. Contest researchers
could borrow affective state research methods from animal
welfare science and psychopharmacology. Exposing fish to
antidepressants and anxiolytics in wastewater has produced
equivocal results: venlafaxine increases aggression [121], but
fluoxetine reduces aggression [122]. To test whether incidental
affective states influence contest behaviour, we need controlled
interventions in more species.
Incidental affective states not only influence contests;
contests might also induce incidental affective states and
influence objectively unrelated cognitive processes (see
[123]). For example, rats that repeatedly lose contests develop
anhedonia (reduced reward sensitivity, expressed in non-
contest situations and linked to depression in humans).
Giving the rats unrelated but signalled food rewards reverses
this effect [124]. Compared to tufted capuchins with subordi-
nate bystanders, capuchins exposed to aggressive bystanders
allocate more attention towards humans [125]. Dominant
capuchins [105] and pigs [104] expect more positive outcomes
from ambiguous spatial stimuli (i.e. optimism), while subor-
dinate cod expect fewer positive outcomes from ambiguous
spatial stimuli [106] (i.e. pessimism). Contest-induced inci-
dental affective states may influence virtually any decision.
Is brightly coloured prey toxic or a mimic? Are rustling
leaves a predator or the wind? When moods bias decisions,
the most encountered emotional stimuli with the longest dur-
ation and most polar valence might determine behaviour,
regardless of objective relevance. It is possible that frequently
winning contests, for example, may induce optimism that
rare prey is edible, even if the prey is usually toxic. This
Table 1. Major predictions and outstanding questions that arise from applying emotion theory to animal contests.
major predictions outstanding questions
Contest appraisals cover more variables than traditionally recognized
(i.e. RV and RHP)
Are contest appraisals sequential? Do untested human appraisals (e.g. perceived
agency) modify contest dynamics in animals?
Positive affective states induce self-assessment; negative states
induce mutual assessment
Do assessment strategies vary with affective state? How might this influence
the outcome?
Winner effects are associated with optimistic responses to
judgement bias tasks; loser effects are associated with
pessimistic responses
What neurocognitive mechanisms underpin judgement bias? Are they equivalent
to the mechanisms underpinning winner/loser effects?
Incidental affective influences modify contest behaviour Do incidental affective states commonly impact contests in nature? Why evolve
a generalized (rather than domain-specific) affective system?
Humans and animals share rules that increase the likelihood of
incidental influences (e.g. concurrence, ambiguity, and link
to moods)
What mechanisms minimize incidental influences? How do these
affect fitness?
The above predictions apply only to animals with a central
nervous system
Do all animals with a central nervous system have affective states? Are contest






example illustrates how decision-making using incidental
information can negatively impact fitness. Incidental affective
states may cause maladaptive behaviour [38].
Given their maladaptive potential, we suggest two reasons
for incidental affective states. First, to be selected, cross-context
affective states must increase fitness on average—not necess-
arily every time. Nettle & Bateson [14] noted that the recent
environment and physical condition persist across behaviour-
al contexts. Lame animals, for instance, cannot fight, forage or
flee from predators, so information from each of these contexts
is integral to the others. Cross-context affective states will be
selected if most are integral, even if some are incidental.
In humans, various measures increase the likelihood that
cross-context affective states only influence relevant cognition
[114,115]. For example, people associate their affective states
with concurrent cognitive processes [126]. Incidental emotion-
al influences are also less common than incidental moods,
because emotions usually have an obvious cause [114].
Animal research may reveal similar mechanisms to limit
incidental affect.
The second possible explanation is that incidental affec-
tive states dominate when animals lack reliable information,
or when acquisition and storage costs outweigh the benefits
[59]. This is why humans evaluating ambiguous stimuli
(e.g. brand names without product details) rely on incidental
affective states [127]. In animal contests, a fight indicates rival
RHP most accurately, but entails substantial investment and
potential injury [64,67]. Assessments in other contexts carry
their own cost/accuracy trade-offs. Bystander effects avoid
fight costs and reflect individual RHP, but they require
individual discrimination and recall [32]. Winner and loser
effects are less cognitively demanding, but based on previous
opponents’ RHP. This measure will predict future opponents’
RHP less accurately than individual assessments. We hypo-
thesize that mood does not even distinguish between
behavioural contexts, further reducing both cognitive require-
ments and accuracy. Incidental affective states may therefore
influence decisions when contestants have less reliableinformation or high information-gathering costs (e.g. intru-
ders). From this perspective, incidental affective states are
the ‘best of a bad job’.
In summary, integral affective states are objectively relevant
and adaptive, whereas incidental affective states are objectively
irrelevant and potentially maladaptive. Incidental influences
may nonetheless seep in when integral information is unavail-
able or costly. Despite preliminary evidence, we do not yet
know the extent of incidental affective states in animal
decision-making. We hope that future researchers test whether
objectively unrelated stimuli impact contest dynamics. Without
integral influences, we predict that generic rewards increase
aggression and generic punishments decrease aggression.6. Conclusion
An affective-states approach generates novel predictions and
opens new avenues for behavioural ecology (table 1). Both
emotions and contest behaviour rely on assessments of
stimuli and their personal significance; both enlist cognition,
drive and neurophysiology; and both reflect reward and
punishment experience. We equate contest assessments to
emotional appraisals, which determine contest decision-
making and behaviour. We explain experience effects as
wins inducing positive moods and losses inducing negative
moods. This hypothesis, and our conception of contests as
emotional episodes, predicts that manipulating affective
state will modify contest behaviour. As well as integral influ-
ences, incidental affective states may impact contests, and
contest-induced affective states may impact objectively
unrelated behaviours. We hypothesize that high-frequency,
long-lasting, polar-valence events disproportionately influence
animal decision-making and behaviour, even if incidental.
Moreover, despite our focus on contests, emotion theory may
underpin all non-reflexive behaviour—from signalling to mate
choice to parental care. Behavioural ecologists and fundamental
ethologists study these fields separately, but affective states
royalsocietypublish
7transcend boundaries. We need a more holistic ethology to
understand affective cognition and behaviour.
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